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Constitutional Law-United States v. DiFrancesco: "Continuing
Jeopardy"--An Old Concept Gains New Life
In Ke.pner v. United States' Justice Holmes stated in regard to the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment:2 "[Llogically and rationally a man
cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however
often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its be-
ginning to the end of the cause."' 3 While the United States Supreme Court
repeatedly has rejected Holmes' concept4 of "continuing jeopardy, '5 a recent
decision has given it new life. In a case of first impression,6 the Court in
United States v. DiFrancesco7 considered the constitutionality of a statute that
allows the government to appeal a sentence as too lenient.8 In affirming the
1. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
2. "No person shall.. . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .... " U.S. Const. amend. V.
3. 195 U.S. at 134 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. The phrase "continuing jeopardy" has been said to describe "both a concept and a con-
clusion." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 534 (1975). The concept denotes the notion advanced by
Justice Holmes: once jeopardy attaches in a particular action a defendant remains in jeopardy
throughout the proceedings related to that action. 195 U.S. at 134. However, the conclusion "has
occasionally been used to explain why an accused who has secured the reversal of his conviction
on appeal may be retried for the same offense." 421 U.S. at 534. See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398
U.S. 323, 326-29 & n.3 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90 & n.6 (1978); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519, 534 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 369 (1975); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 193, 197 (1957).
6. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), was the first case in which the govern-
ment appealed a sentence imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976). For a discussion of
§ 3575, see note 12 infra. In several other cases, the government has appealed because of the trial
court's refusal to sentence a defendant under § 3575. See, e.g., United States v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d
399 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Bailey, 537 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975).
7. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976). This statute provides:
With respect to the imposition, correction, or reduction of a sentence after proceed-
ings under section 3575 of this chapter, a review of the sentence on the record of the
sentencing court may be taken by the defendant or the United States to a court of ap-
peals. Any review of the sentence taken by the United States shall be taken at least five
days before expiration of the time for taking a review of the sentence or appeal of the
conviction by the defendant and shall be diligently prosecuted. The sentencing court
may, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for taking a review of the
sentence for a period not to exceed thirty days from the expiration of the time otherwise
prescribed by law. The court shall not extend the time for taking a review of the sen-
tence by the United States after the time has expired. A court extending the time for
taking a review of the sentence by the United States shall extend the time for taking a
review of the sentence or appeal of the conviction by the defendant for the same period.
The taking of a review of sentence by the United States shall be deemed the taking of a
review of the sentence and an appeal of the conviction by the defendant. Review of the
sentence shall include review of whether the procedure employed was lawful, the find-
ings made were clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court's discretion was abused. The
court of appeals on review of the sentence may, after considering the record, including
the entire presentence report, information submitted during the trial of such felony and
the sentencing heari., and the findings and reasons of the sentencing court, affirm the
sentence, impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing court
could originally have imposed, or remand for further sentencing proceedings and impo-
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constitutionality of this statute, the Court held that section 3576 of the Crimi-
nal Code9 did not violate either the guarantee against multiple trials or the
guarantee against multiple punishment, both inherent in the double jeopardy
clause.10
Eugene DiFrancesco was convicted of racketeering and bombing in two
separate jury trials in the United States District Court for the Western District
of New York." Subsequently, the court conducted a special sentencing hear-
ing at which it ruled that DiFrancesco was a "dangerous special offender,"'
2
sitions of sentence, except that a sentence may be made more severe only on review of
the sentence taken by the United States and after hearing. Failure of the United States
to take a review of the imposition of the sentence shall, upon review taken by the United
States of the correction or reduction of the sentence, foreclose imposition of a sentence
more severe than that previously imposed. Any withdrawal or dismissal of a sentence
taken by the United States shall foreclose imposition of a sentence more severe that that
reviewed but shall not otherwise foreclose the review of the sentence or the appeal of the
conviction. The court of appeals shall state in writing the reasons for its disposition of
the review of the sentence. Any review of the sentence taken by the United States may
be dismissed on a showing of abuse of the right of the United States to take such review.
9. Section 3576 is part of the Dangerous Offender Sentencing Statutes of Title X of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 950 (1970) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-78 (1976)).
10. 449 U.S. at 126-43. In so holding, the Court to some extent settled what has become a
favorite controversy among academic and professional commentators. For conclusions that
prosecutorial appeals of sentences are constitutional, see Dunsky, The Constitutionality of In-
creasing Sentences on Appellate Review, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 19 (1978); Stern, Govern-
ment Appeals of Criminal Sentences: A Constitutional Response to Arbitrary and Unreasonable
Sentences, 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 51 (1980); Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflec-
tions on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001 (1980); Note, Double
Jeopardy Limits on Prosecutorial Appeal of Sentences, 1980 Duke L. J. 847; Recent Development,
Government Appeal of Dangerous Special Offender Sentence Violates Double Jeopardy Clause,
65 Cornell L. Rev. 715 (1980).
For conclusions that such appeals are unconstitutional, see ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Fed-
eral Criminal Code, Report on Government Appeal of Sentences, 35 Bus. Law. 617 (1980); Free-
man & Earley, United States v. DiFrancesco: Government Appeal of Sentences, 18 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 91 (1980); Spence, The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 and Prosecutorial Appeal
of Sentences: Justice or Double Jeopardy?, 37 Md. L. Rev. 739 (1978); Note, Twice in Jeopardy:
Prosecutorial Appeals of Sentences, 63 Va. L. Rev. 325 (1977).
See also Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for Habitual
or Dangerous Criminals, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 356 (1975) (question unclear).
11. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 117
(1980). DiFrancesco was indicted first on the bombing charges (18 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 371, 8420)
(1976)), but was tried first on the racketeering indictment (18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d) (1976)). 604
F.2d at 772-73.
12. 604 F.2d at 779-80. Prior to the trial on the racketeering charges, the government filed
notice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1976), alleging that DiFrancesco was a "dangerous special
offender" as defined in sections 3575(e)(3) and (f). 604 F.2d at 779. Such notice indicates the
government's intention to seek, upon defendant's conviction, imposition of an enhanced sentence
under section 3575(b). Section 3575(b) requires the district court to hold a special sentencing
hearing to determine whether the defendant is a "dangerous special offender." This statute pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Upon any plea of guilty or nolo contendere or verdict or finding of guilty of the
defendant of such felony, a hearing shall be held, before sentence is imposed, by the
court sitting without a jury. . . . If it appears by a preponderance of the information,
including information submitted during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hear-
ing and so much of the presentence report as the court relies upon, that the defendant is a
dangerous special offender, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment foran appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate m severityto the maximum term otherwis  authorized b  law for such felony. Otherwise it shall
sentence the defendant in accordance with the law prescribing penalties for such felony.
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and sentenced him to concurrent ten-year prison terms on the racketeering
charges, to be served concurrently with the nine-year sentence imposed previ-
ously on the bombing charges.13 Dissatisfied with this sentence, the govern-
ment appealed pursuant to section 3576.14 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, rejecting the government's request for an en-
hanced sentence on the ground that section 3576 violated the double jeopardy
clause, 15 affirmed both the sentences and the convictions. 16
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court analyzed three basic
issues. First, noting that the double jeopardy focus fell on the sentence rather
than on the appeal,1 7 the Court considered whether a criminal sentence should
be accorded the degree of finality that attaches to a verdict of acquittal.18 Cit-
ing early English common law, 19 North Carolina v. Pearce,20 and the policy
behind the double jeopardy bar to reprosecution after an acquittal,2 1 the Court
concluded that "neither the history of sentencing practices, nor the pertinent
rulings of this Court, nor even considerations of double jeopardy policy sup-
The court shall place in the record its findings, including an identification of the infor-
mation relied upon in making such findings, and its reasons for the sentence imposed.
18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
13. 604 F.2d at 780.
14. Id. The government based its appeal on the ground that the trial court abused its discre-
tion: despite its findings that defendant was a "dangerous special offender," the trial court im-
posed sentences that amounted to additional imprisonment for defendant of only one year. See
notes 8, 12 and accompanying text supra. DiFrancesco appealed from both convictions, but did
not seek review of the sentences. 449 U.S. at 123.
15. 604 F.2d at 783. The Second Circuit's holding was based principally on Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), and United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931). 604 F.2d at
783-85. For a discussion of Kepner and Benz, see text accompanying notes 35-38 & 59-63 infra.
The court distinguished North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), on the ground that the
defendant in Pearce had voluntarily subjected himself to the risk of an increased sentence. 604
F.2d at 786; see text accompanying notes 53-57 infra. By holding that section 3576 was unconsti-
tutional, the Second Circuit lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the government's appeal,
and therefore dismissed it. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
In a concurring opinion, District Judge Haight (sitting by designation from the Southern
District of New York) argued that the government's appeal should have been dismissed because
18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-76 did not apply to the defendant. He reasoned that DiFrancesco could have
been sentenced to two consecutive 20-year terms without imposition of the "dangerous special
offender" sentence, and therefore did not qualify under section 3575(f) for the special sentence.
604 F.2d at 787-89 (Haight, J., concurring). He added, however, that in the event his interpreta-
tion proved incorrect, he would support the majority's constitutional analysis. Id. at 789 n.7.
16. Id. at 773-79.
17. 449 U.S. at 132-35.
18. Id. at 132-33.
19. Id. at 133-34. The Court observed that at early English common law, the trial court
practice of increasing a sentence during the same term of court was not thought to violate double
jeopardy principles. For several brief summaries of the United States Constitution's assimilation
of early English common law principles of double jeopardy, see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 87 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1975); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); id. at 200 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
20. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See text accompanying notes 52-55 infra.
21. "We have noted above the basic design of the double jeopardy provision, that is, as a bar
against repeated attempts to convict, with consequent subjection of the defendant to embarrass-
ment, expense, anxiety, and insecurity, and the possibility that he may be found guilty even
though innocent." 449 U.S. at 136 (paraphrasing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957)). The Court stated that a government appeal of a sentence did not subject a defendant to
this ordeal, because the appeal must be taken promptly and because the appeal is essentially a
nonadversarial judicial review of the record of the sentencing court. 449 U.S. at 136-37.
1982]
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port" the proposition that a sentence carries the same degree of finality as an
acquittal.22 The Court then considered whether an increase in a sentence pur-
suant to section 3576 constituted multiple punishment. In concluding that it
did not, the Court stated that the Second Circuit's reliance on dictum in United
States v. Benz 23 was unfounded, because the dictum's source, Ex parte
Lange,24 stood only for the proposition that a defendant may not be sentenced
beyond what is legislatively authorized.25 Finally, the Court compared the
sentence review procedure provided in section 3576 with the two-stage crimi-
nal proceeding held constitutional in Swisher v. Brady.26 Noting that the pro-
cedure under section 3576 is more limited in scope than the procedure in
Swisher, the Court concluded that "the limited appellate review of a sentence
authorized by section 3576 is necessarily constitutional.
'27
In a vigorous dissent,28 Justice Brennan argued that sentencing and ac-
quittal procedures are sufficiently similar so that no meaningful distinction
may be drawn between the two for double jeopardy purposes.29 He also criti-
cized the majority's refusal to follow established dicta in Lange, Benz, and
Reid v. Covert,30 which stated that an increase in sentence severity subsequent
to its imposition constituted multiple punishment.31 He characterized the
Court's comparison of the procedure provided in section 3576 with that up-
held in Swisher v. Brady as being "similarly misplaced."
'3 2
Although the Supreme Court's application of the double jeopardy clause
has been infamously amorphous,33 a brief survey of prior decisions is a pre-
22. 449 U.S. at 132. Accordingly, a government appeal of a sentence did not constitute a
second prosecution in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 139.
23. 282 U.S. 304 (1931). See text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
24. 85 U.S (18 Wall.) 163 (1874). See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
25. 449 U.S. at 138-39.
26. 438 U.S. 204 (1978). See text accompanying notes 67-69 infra.
27. 449 U.S. at 141. The Court interpreted section 3576 "as establishing at the most a two-
stage criminal proceeding." Id. at 439 n.16.
28. Id. at 143-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting; White, Marshall, Stevens, JJ., joining). In addition
to joining Justice Brennan's dissent, Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion that merely
echoed Justice Harlan's dissent in Pearce. See note 54 infra.
29. "The sentencing of a convicted criminal is sufficiently analogous to a determination of
guilt or innocence that the Double Jeopardy Clause should preclude government appeals from
sentencing decisions very much as it prevents appeals from judgments of acquittal." Id. at 146. In
Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981), the Court adopted this position with respect to the
sentencing procedure employed by the State of Missouri. See discussion at note 70 infra.
30. 354 U.S. 1, 37 n.68 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("In Swain v. United States, 165 U.S. 553,
this Court held that the President or commanding officer had power to return a case to a court-
martial for an increase in sentence. If the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment
were applicable such a practice would be unconstitutional."). Reid was subsequently adopted as
the controlling opinion of the Court in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,
237 (1960); Grisham v. Hogan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960); and McElroy v. United States cx rel.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960).
31. 449 U.S. at 144-45. This criticism approved the position taken by the Second Circuit.
See note 15 supra.
32. 449 U.S. at 151.
33. "[V]irtually all of the [double jeopardy] cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape
meaningful categorization. . . ." Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973). "[The riddle of
double jeopardy stands out today as one of the most commonly recognized yet most commonly
misunderstood maxims in the law, the passage of time having served in the main to burden it with
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requisite to understanding the Court's tripartite analysis in DiFrancesco. Be-
ginning with United States v. Ball,34 the Supreme Court established that the
double jeopardy clause is an absolute bar to a second trial following an acquit-
tal. In Kepner v. United States35 the Court applied this rule to a government
appeal.36 In that case, the defendant was acquitted at his original trial, but the
government appealed pursuant to traditional Philippine procedure that pro-
vided for a trial de novo in the Philippine Supreme Court. Applying the Ball
principle, the United States Supreme Court rejected Justice Holmes' "continu-
ing jeopardy" theory37 and held that the procedure in the appellate court was
a second trial on the merits.38 The Court subsequently has applied the Ball
principle to bar retrials following an acquittal even when "the acquittal was
based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation."
39
In Green v. United States40 the Court extended this rule to cases of "im-
plied acquittals." In Green, the defendant was convicted of first-degree mur-
der after an appellate court had reversed his prior conviction on the lesser
included offense of second-degree murder. Rejecting an argument based on
Trono v. United States4 l that the defendant had "waived" his double jeopardy
claim by appealing his first conviction, the Court reversed the second convic-
tion on the ground that the prior verdict of guilty on the second-degree murder
confusion upon confusion." Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 522, 522 (1940), quoted in Westen & Drubel,
Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 82. This Note does not
attempt to examine the vast and integrated history of the double jeopardy clause. For a brief but
in-depth survey of such history, see J. Sigler, Double Jeopardy 1-37 (1969).
34. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). In Ball, three defendants were tried upon a technically defective
murder indictment: one was acquitted and two were convicted. Subsequent to the Supreme
Court's reversal of the convictions in Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891), all three defend-
ants were retried and convicted. On second appeal, the Court held that the double jeopardy
clause prohibited reprosecution of the formerly acquitted defendant but did not prohibit rep-
rosecution of the defendants formerly convicted. The Court reasoned that the double jeopardy
clause prohibited retrial of a defendant following a favorable ruling by the finder of fact. 163 U.S.
at 671.
35. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
36. Prior to 1970 the government's authority to appeal was severely limited. In United States
v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892), the Supreme Court held that the government could not appeal a
criminal decision absent explicit legislative authorization. Id. at 318, 322-23. This authorization
was first granted by the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907), which
empowered the government to appeal from a decision dismissing an indictment or arresting a
judgment when such decision was based upon the construction or invalidation of a statute. After
several amendments, Congress repealed the 1907 Act in 1970 and replaced it with its current
version: the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1890 (1971) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)). For a thorough account of the evolution of the Omnibus Act, see
United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 291-96 (1970).
37. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
38. 195 U.S. at 133.
39. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam); Arizona v. Washing-
ton, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (quoting Fong Foo) (dictum). But cf. United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 344-45 (1976) (government appeals following acquittals are prohibited only when there
is the possibility of reprosecution for the same offense).
40. 335 U.S. 184 (1957).
41. 199 U.S. 521 (1905). See text accompanying notes 45-47 infra. With respect to the waiver
doctrine of Trono, the Green Court stated: "Conditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced
surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict
with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy." 355 U.S. at 193-94 (footnote omitted).
1982]
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charge operated as an "implicit acquittal" of the first-degree murder charge.
42
The Court reasoned that with respect to the first-degree murder charge, jeop-
ardy attached in the first trial when the jury "was given a full opportunity to
return a verdict" on that charge.
43
The Court has refused to extend the absolute rule applied to acquittals of
substantive offenses to the sentencing area. The Court has at various times
advanced several different theories to explain the permissibility of increasing a
sentence following an appeal of a conviction.44 The oldest of these theories
was enunciated in Trono v. United States.4s There the defendants were acquit-
ted of murder but convicted of assault. On defendants' appeal, the Philippine
Supreme Court reversed the assault conviction but convicted the defendants of
murder.46 The United States Supreme Court upheld the murder conviction,
stating that the defendants had "waived" their right to invoke the plea of for-
mer jeopardy on the murder charge by appealing their assault convictions.
47
42. 355 U.S. at 190.
43. Id. at 191.
44. Aside from the waiver doctrine of Trono, the Court has employed two other theories.
One is the balancing theory espoused by Justice Harlan in United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463
(1964):
Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in
punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high
price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment
because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading
to conviction. From the standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate
courts would be as zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects of improprie-
ties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction would put the
accused irrevocably beyond the reach of further prosecution. In reality, therefore, the
practice of retrial serves defendants' rights as well as society's interests.
Id. at 466. Although this theory easily explains reprosecution following a conviction, it does not
easily explain an increase in sentence following reconviction. To strike the balance in favor of the
state, a court would have to find that the defendant did not preserve his interest in avoiding the
anxiety of resentencing, and his interest in having the same tribunal that tried the case fix the
sentence. Clearly, the balance swings against the defendant, provided that he forfeits his interests
by appealing his conviction; however, this result simply restates the "waiver" theory.
The third theory is the continuing jeopardy "conclusion" most recently employed in Price v.
Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326-27 & n.3 (1970). Although the Price opinion referred to the theory as a
"concept," id. at 326, the Court later sought to distinguish Holmes' notion of continuing jeopardy
from Price's by denoting Holmes' as a "concept" and Price's as a "conclusion." Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519, 534 (1975). See note 4 supra. Despite this unnecessary confusion, the two notions
are readily distinguishable. Holmes' concept means simply that for any one crime there can attach
only one jeopardy regardless of how often a defendant may be tried for that crime. For example,
if a defendant's sentence for a certain crime is increased, he is not subjected to a second jeopardy
because he is being punished only for the one crime he committed. Thus, the jeopardy does not
terminate until the state has exhausted its power to pursue the defendant. Price's conclusion is just
that: a conclusory orpost hoc characterization of a certain event that facilitates an understanding
of the rationale upon which the event is based. Price permitted reprosecution of a defendant
whose conviction was reversed because of an erroneous jury instruction. In this context, "continu-
ing jeopardy" was merely a shorthand expression used to convey the Court's belief that a defend-
ant once adjudged guilty should not be set free upon a procedural technicality which may or may
not be related to the original verdict.
45. 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
46. As in Kepner, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was empowered to determine
the guilt or innocence of the defendants and to impose sentences upon appeal. Id. at 533-34.
47. Id. at 533. With respect to a defendant's appeal from the judgment of a trial court, the
Court stated:
As the judgment stands before he appeals, it is a complete bar to any further prosecu-
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This waiver doctrine was extended in Flemister v. United States,48 Ocampo v.
United States,4 9 and Stroud v. United States50 to allow sentence increases fol-
lowing conviction upon retrial.
Although Green is cited for substantially vitiating Trono and its prog-
eny,5' the underlying substantive import of these decisions was reaffirmed em-
phatically in North Carolina v. Pearce.52 There the defendant was sentenced
to prison after his conviction for assault with intent to commit rape. Upon
securing the reversal of his conviction, the defendant was again convicted and
was sentenced to a prison term greater than the original. In holding that the
double jeopardy clause did not bar an increase in sentence following a retrial
for the same offense 53, the Court rejected the argument that the defendant's
initial sentence should be treated as an "implied acquittal" of any greater sen-
tence, distinguishing Green as "based upon the double jeopardy provision's
guarantee against retrial for an offense of which the defendant was acquit-
ted."54 In what smacks of a subtle resurrection of the waiver doctrine, the
tion for the offense set forth in the indictment, or of any lesser degree thereof. No power
can wrest from him the right to so use that judgment, but if he chooses to appeal from it
and to ask for its reversal he thereby waives, if successful, his right to avail himself of the
former acquittal of the greater offense, contained in the judgment which he has himself
procured to be reversed.
Id.
48. 207 U.S. 372 (1907). In Flemister, the defendant was convicted in the court of first in-
stance of resisting arrest. On defendant's appeal, the Philippine Supreme Court decided that the
offense fell within a different statute, and increased the sentence. The United States Supreme
Court upheld the increase. Id. at 374.
49. 234 U.S. 91 (1914). The facts in Ocampo were very similar to those in Flemister. The
Court relied on Kepner and Femister in again upholding an increase in sentence by the Philippine
Supreme Court. Id. at 102.
50. 251 U.S. 15 (1919). The defendant in Stroud, popularly known as the "Birdman of Alca-
traz," was tried and convicted three times on the same first degree murder charge. Imposed re-
spectively were sentences of death, life imprisonment, and death. Relying on Trono, the Court
held that the sentence of life imprisonment following the second trial did not prohibit imposition
of the death penalty following the third trial. Id. at 17-18. The Court observed that "the plaintiff
in error himself evoked the action of the court which resulted in a further trial. In such cases he is
not placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the Constitution." Id. at 18.
51. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (citing Green) ("It cannot be mean-
ingfully said that a person 'waives' his right to a judgment of acquittal by moving for a new
trial."). But see note 55 & accompanying text infra.
52. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
53. Id. at 719-23.
54. Id. at 720 n.16 (emphasis in original). See also Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25
(1973) ("The possibility of a higher sentence was recognized and accepted [in Pearce] as a legiti-
mate concomitant of the retrial process."). In response to the Pearce majority's distinction of
Green, Justice Harlan wrote:
Every consideration enunciated by the Court in support of the decision in Green
applies with equal force to the situation at bar. In each instance, the defendant was once
subjected to the risk of receiving a maximum punishment, but it was determined by legal
process that he should receive only a specified punishment less than the maximum....
And the concept or fiction of an "implicit acquittal" of the greater offense ... applies
equally to the greater sentence: in each case it was determined at the former trial that the
defendant or his offense was of a certain limited degree of 'badness' or gravity only, and
therefore merited only a certain limited punishment ....
If, as a matter of policy and practicality, the imposition of an increased sentence on
retrial has the same consequences whether effected in the guise of an increase in the
degree or an augmentation of punishment, what other factors render one route forbidden
and the other permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause? It cannot be that the
19821
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Court argued that the "rationale" for allowing the government to retry a de-
fendant after a reversed conviction "rests ultimately upon the premise that the
original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the
slate wiped clean."
55
In the multiple punishment area, the Supreme Court in Exparte Lange
56
established that a trial court may not impose an additional sentence subse-
quent to one legally imposed and fully executed. In Lange, the defendant was
convicted of stealing mail bags, a crime punishable by imprisonment for not
more that one year or a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $200. None-
theless, the defendant was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and fined
$200. Noting that the defendant had paid the fine, the Court granted defend-
ant's writ of habeas corpus, holding that "when the prisoner, as in this case,
had fully suffered one of the alternative punishments for which alone the law
subjected him, the power of the court to punish further was gone." 57 More
importantly, the Court observed in dictum that "after judgment has been ren-
dered on the conviction, and the sentence of that judgment executed on the
criminal, he [cannot] be again sentenced on that conviction to another...
punishment.
58
In United States v. Benz,59 the Court again addressed the issue of a trial
court's sentencing authority. There the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge
of violating the National Prohibition Act and was sentenced to a ten-month
prison term. While serving this sentence, and before expiration of the term of
the federal district court which had imposed the sentence, the defendant peti-
tioned the court for a modification of his punishment. Over the government's
objection, the court reduced the term of imprisonment to six months. On ap-
peal by the government, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether a federal court had the
power to reduce a term of imprisonment under such circumstances. 60 Holding
that such reduction was permissible,61 the Court, citing Lange,62 added in dic-
provision does not comprehend "sentences"-as distinguished from "offenses"-for it
has long been established that once a prisoner commences service of sentence, the Clause
prevents a court from vacating the sentence and then imposing a greater one.
395 U.S. at 746-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 720-21 (emphasis added). At least one commentator recognized the possible effect
of Trono and its progeny post-Green. Low, Special Offender Sentencing, 8 Am. Crim. L.Q. 70, 86-
87 (1970) ("It seems clear to me that if Stroud, Ocampo, and F/emis/er are correct, then it should
be constitutional for the government to seek an increase in the sentence on appeal.").
56. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
57. Id. at 176.
58. Id. at 173.
59. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
60. Id. at 306. The question certified to the Court was:
After a District Court of the United States has imposed a sentence of imprisonment
upon a defendant in a criminal case, and after he has served a part of the sentence, has
that court, during the term in which it was imposed, power to amend the sentence by
shortening the term of imprisonment?
61. Id. at 306-07, 311.
62. Although the Court cited Lange extensively, it did not attempt to rationalize the distin-
guishing fact that Lange dealt only with the prohibition against imposing punishment beyond that
which was statutorily authorized.
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turn "that to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double punish-
ment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment .... 63
Sixteen years later, however, the Benz dictum was qualified in Bozza v.
United States.64 The defendant in Bozza was convicted of violating several
Internal Revenue provisions that mandated both a fine and imprisonment, but
was sentenced to imprisonment only. Upon discovering his error, the trial
judge several hours later returned the defendant to court and added the
mandatory fine. Relying on Benz, the defendant urged that the increased pun-
ishment placed him twice in jeopardy. The Court rejected this argument on
the ground that the pronouncement of final sentence does not preclude correc-
tion when that sentence is invalid.65 Accordingly, the court held that substitu-
tion of a valid sentence for an invalid one, despite its increased severity, "did
not twice place the [defendant] in jeopardy for the same offense."
66
In the recent case of Swisher v. Brady,6 7 the Court again had occasion to
examine the double jeopardy clause. In that case, the Court considered a chal-
lenge to a procedure employed by the Maryland juvenile criminal system.
Under that procedure, a master submitted a record of findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and recommendations to the juvenile court judge who could
adopt, modify or reject it. This record was then subject to review at the elec-
tion of the juvenile defendant, the State or the judge sua sponte, except that
when the State filed exceptions and sought review of the judge's decision, the
review was limited solely to the record developed by the master.68 In rejecting
the argument that the Maryland procedure required a juvenile defendant to
stand trial a second time in violation of the double jeopardy clause, the Court
stated that "an accused juvenile is subjected to a single proceeding which be-
gins with a master's hearing and culminates with an adjudication by a
judge."
69
Faced with these variegated and tangentially related prior cases, the
Supreme Court decided United States v. DiFrancesco. Although yet to express
63. 282 U.S. at 307. Similar dicta have been expressed in other Supreme Court and lower
court cases. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 n.68 (1957); United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d
126 (Ist Cir. 1977); Virgin Islands v. Henry, 533 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Turner,
518 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1975); Barnes v. United States, 419 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States
v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Chiarella, 214 F.2d 838 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 902 (1954); Oxman v. United States, 148 F.2d 750 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945); Frankel v. United States, 131 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1942); Rowley v.
Welch, 114 F.2d 499, 501 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1940). But cf. Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891 (8th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 988 (1965) (sentence could be increased where defendant has not
commenced service). See also Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172, 1176 (4th Cir. 1974) (uphold-
ing increase) ("We find no suggestion that by dictum the Benz Court intended to broaden Exparte
Lange'r interpretation of the double jeopardy clause.").
64. 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
65. Id. at 166.
66. Id. at 167.
67. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
68. Id. at 210-11 & n.9 (describing and quoting Md. R.P. 911).
69. 438 U.S. at 215.
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a satisfactory rationale, 70 the Court's prior decisions have evidenced different
treatment of acquittals and sentencing. In United States v. Ball and Kepner v.
United States, the Court established that the double jeopardy clause is an ab-
solute bar to a second trial following an acquittal.71 This rule was extended in
Green v. United States to preclude retrial of a defendant for a greater offense
following a reversal of his conviction on a lesser included charge.72 In North
Carolina v. Pearce, however, the Court refused to extend Green's rationale to
sentencing.73 Based arguably on the waiver doctrine of Trono v. United
States,74 Pearce effectively demonstrated that a sentence does not carry the
finality of an acquittal.
The DiFrancesco Court's reliance on Pearce nonetheless may be criticized
in at least two respects. First, the DiFrancesco Court's interpretation of
Pearce's dictate regarding the finality of sentences is illogical. The Court rea-
soned that "[i]f any rule of finality had applied to the pronouncement of a
sentence, the original sentence in Pearce would have served as a ceiling on the
one imposed at retrial."75 The Court then added that any difference between
the imposition of a new sentence after retrial and one imposed following an
appeal "is no more than a 'conceptual nicety.' "76 However, this "conceptual
nicety"-retrial before resentencing-is the very mechanism that removed the
sentence ceiling in Pearce: "[W]e deal here, not with increases in existing
sentences, but with the imposition of wholly new sentences after wholly new
trials."' 77 Second, the waiver doctrine asserted in Pearce does not fit
DiFrancesco. In Pearce, the defendant initiated the appeal; in DiFrancesco,
70. The DiFrancesco Court did note Professor Westen's explanation of the underlying basis
for the Court's distinction between judgments of acquittal and verdicts of conviction: the jury's
prerogative to acquit against the evidence. 449 U.S. at 130 n. 11. See Westen, The Three Faces of
Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev.
1001, 1064-65 (1980). The cogency of this rationale can be seen in Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S.
Ct. 1852 (1981), a decision handed down several months after DiFrancesco. There the defendant
initially was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, and subse-
quently reconvicted and sentenced to death. Under Missouri procedure, once a defendant is con-
victed of first-degree murder, the prosecutor in a separate proceeding before the same jury must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's crime warrants imposition of the death
penalty. The Court held that because under Missouri law the sentencing proceeding at the de-
fendant's first trial was almost identical to the trial on the question of innocence or guilt, the death
penalty could not be imposed upon retrial. Id. at 1862. The Court distinguished Pearce, on the
ground that "there was no separate sentencing proceeding at which the prosecution was required
to prove-beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise-additional facts in order to justify the partic-
ular sentence." Id. at 1858.
As Professor Westen points out, however, this rationale cannot explain the Court's willing-
ness to attribute the same degree of sanctity to bench trial acquittals as it does to jury acquittals.
He suggests that the Court could eliminate a great deal of the confusion plaguing the double
jeopardy decisions by recognizing why acquittals should be accorded such a high de ree of final-
ity-because the jury should be the final arbiters of the defendant's innocence or guilt. This rec-
ognition would of course entail a redefining of the word "acquittal." See Westen, supra, at 1064-
65.
71. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
72. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
75. 449 U.S. at 135 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 136.
77. 395 U.S. at 722.
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the government appealed over the objection of the defendant. 78
Similarly, the Court's analysis of the multiple punishment issue is also
subject to criticism. In concluding that an increase in sentence on appellate
review does not constitute multiple punishment, the Court stated that a de-
fendant has no expectation of finality in an original sentence that Congress
specifically subjected to review.79 Manifestly, this syllogism merely begs the
constitutional question of the validity of such a provision.
Though the Court's characterizations of the holdings in Exparte Lange
and United States v. Benz are technically correct, the Court chose to ignore a
well-established principle spawned by dicta in both of the cases. The Court
observed that Lange stated simply that a trial judge may impose only a statu-
torily authorized sentence, while Benz stated that a trial judge had the power
to reduce a defendant's sentence after service had begun.80 In limiting the
Benz dictum to Lange's specific context,8 ' however, the Court ran roughshod
over dicta in those cases82 and others which stated that a trial court may not.
increase a validly imposed sentence once service of that sentence had begun.
83
Furthermore, such cavalier treatment of these time-honored dicta cannot be
justified on Bozza's qualification of Benz.84 Bozza dealt with the issue of in-
creasing an invalid sentence and in no way addressed the issue of increasing a
valid sentence. Thus, Bozza does not disturb the Lange-Benz prohibition
against increasing validly imposed sentences.
85
Finally, the DiFrancesco Court's analogy to the procedure upheld in
Swisher v. Brady86 invites criticism. The DiFrancesco Court lightly dismissed
the difference between an informal master's proceeding and a federal trial as
being "of no constitutional consequence."87 The Court failed to recognize,
however, that under the Maryland system the master has no authority to im-
pose sentences.88 As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, surely the
majority did not intend to characterize a federal trial judge's imposition of
78. Brief for Respondent at 2-9, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). Congress
attempted to circumvent this problem by providing for an automatic review of a defendant's con-
viction and sentence upon the taking of a review by the government. See note 8 supra. Such a
provision, however, is at most a forced consent.
79. 449 U.S. at 139.
80. Id. at 138. See text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
81. 449 U.S. at 139.
82. See text accompanying notes 58 & 63 supra.
83. See cases cited note 63 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
85. Indeed, several circuit courts have treated Bozza in precisely this manner. See, e.g., May-
field v. United States, 504 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Scott, 502 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974);
Thompson v. United States, 495 F.2d 1304 (Ist Cir. 1974); United States v. Mack, 494 F.2d 1204
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975). Nevertheless, Bozza may provide precedential
support for the Court's holding in DiFrancesco. If DiFrancesco's initial sentence is regarded as
invalid because of the trial court's abuse of discretion in imposing it, Bozza mandates that the
sentence must be increased. The DiFrancesco Court, however, failed to make this argument.
86. 438 U.S. 204 (1978). See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
87. 449 U.S. at 141.
88. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 211-12 n.9 (1978) (quoting Md. R.P. 911).
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sentence as a "mere recommendation." 89 Logically extended, Swisher's ra-
tionale would define a federal trial as "a single proceeding which begins with a
[trial judge's] hearing and culminates in an adjudication by [an appellate
court]." 9 0
Criticism notwithstanding, the impact of DiFrancesco cannot be underes-
timated. With the appellate door now open, prosecutors will be free to appeal
a sentence whenever a defendant falls within the definition of a "dangerous
special offender."91 Although this freedom will not be without statutory re-
straint, 92 appeals pursuant to section 3576 possibly could deluge the already
overburdened appellate courts. Nevertheless, appellate review of sentences
imposed under the Dangerous Special Offender provisions could to a limited
extent provide a check on what has become a major problem in the criminal
justice system: lack of sentence uniformity.
93
Moreover, DiFrancesco could have a profound impact on both existing
and future legislation. The Dangerous Special Drug Defender provision of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 197094 practi-
cally mirrors the Dangerous Special Offender provisions. To date, the appeal
provision provided in section 849(h) of the Act-the counterpart of section
3576 9 5-has not been used by the government. In light of DiFrancesco, how-
ever, it will not be surprising to see a proliferation in the government's use of
this appeal provision. More importantly, section 3576 could be a forerunner
of a wide-ranging system of appellate review of all criminal sentences. Legis-
lation now pending in Congress would allow the government to appeal any
sentence that falls below that established by a set minimum guideline.96 The
timeliness of DiFrancesco is thus crucial in that it may well assuage Congress'
89. 449 U.S. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. 438 U.S. at 215. See text accompanying note 69 supra. Furthermore, the appellate proce-
dure in DiFrancesco conceivably could allow the prosecution a forbidden "second crack" at the
defendant, because review may incorporate facts outside the trial record.
The court of appeals on review of the sentence may, after considering the record, includ-
ing the entire presentence report, information submitted during the trial of such felony
and the sentencing hearing, and the findings and reasons of the sentencing court, affirm
the sentence, impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing court
could originally have imposed, or remandforfurther sentencing proceedings and imposi.
tion of sentence ....
18 U.S.C. § 3576 (emphasis added).
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1976).
92. The government may appeal only when "the sentencing procedure employed [is]
[un]lawful, the findings made [are] clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court's discretion [is]
abused." 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
93. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 918 (1980) ("Unwarranted disparity occurs
in the sentences imposed by judges in the same district and in sentences imposed from one district
or circuit in the Federal system to another."). See generally M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law
Without Order (1973); P. O'Donnel, M. Churgin & D. Curtis, Toward a Just and Effective Sen-
tencing System (1977). This argument was one of the underlying bases of the decision in
DiFrancesco. 449 U.S. at 142.
94. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-849 (1976)),
95. 21 U.S.C. § 849(h) is a verbatim replication of 18 U.S.C. § 3576.
96. Compare S. 1722, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3725 (1979) (allowing government appeals of
sentences) with H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4101 (1980) (omitting any provision allowing
government appeals of sentences).
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doubts concerning the constitutionality of such legislation.97 Similarly,
DiFrancesco may give rise to the enactment of state statutes similar to section
3576. Thus far, no state has allowed its prosecutors to appeal a sentence uni-
laterally.98 But with the constitutionality of section 3576 now secure, states
may begin affording their prosecutors the same power as that enjoyed by their
federal counterparts.9 9
The Supreme Court rightly decided United States v. DiFrancesco, but not
without paying a high price. As the Court noted, the Dangerous Special Of-
fender provisions, including section 3576, represent a concentrated effort by
Congress to attack a specific problem in our criminal justice system. 1° ° Sec-
tion 3576 was enacted as a direct result of the lenient sentences imposed in
cases involving organized crime management personnel. 10 As a result of the
legal maze created by the double jeopardy cases, the Court was able to effectu-
ate Congress' intent by concocting a decision that rests precariously within the
bounds of stare decisis. Though the Supreme Court has in good faith at-
tempted to find its way through this maze, it has done nothing less than return
to the point from which it began. By failing to articulate a satisfactory theory
for "its conviction-acquittal distinction regarding double jeopardy, the
DiFrancesco Court has given life to a theory that it long ago rejected.'
0 2
DiFrancesco redefines double jeopardy, at least for defendants designated as
"dangerous special offenders," as "one continuing jeopardy from its beginning
to the end of the [appeal]."'1 3
JEFFREY NEIL ROBINSON
97. See S. 1722, 96th Con.&., 1st Sess. § 3725(b) (1979). Despite the Second Circuit's holding
in DiFrancesco, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S. 1722 noted that while the Commit-
tee disagreed with that holding, it modified its bill to provide that an initial sentence subject to
review is "provisional." S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1140 (1979). For a complete docu-
mentary tracing the American Bar Association's sinuous history concerning its position on govern-
ment appeals, see ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Criminal Code, Report on Government
Appeal of Sentences, 35 Bus. Law. 617 (1980).
98. Several states allow appellate courts to increase sentences, but only upon the defendant's
motion for review. For a list of state statutes permitting such increases, see Note, Double Jeop-
ardy Limits on Prosecutorial Appeal on Sentences, 1980 Duke L.J. 847, 847 n.5.
99. This result assumes that the state constitution in question would allow government ap-
peals of sentences.
100. 449 U.S. at 142.
101. See S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 85-87 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4007-09.
102. See notes 51 & 70 supra.
103. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See text ac-
companying note 3 supra.
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